whose multiple dimensions are well addressed in the International Crisis Group's report entitled "Timor-Leste's Displacement Crisis." [1] The irony could not be lost on Timor-Leste that one of the PBC's specific briefs is to "extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery." [2] Initially, only Burundi and Sierra Leone came under the purview of the PCB, although emergency funding had also been advanced to Cote d' Ivoire and the Central African Republic. In December 2007, following a request from the government of Guinea-Bissau, and backed by Brazil, that country became the third to win PBC support as a state in danger of backsliding into violence. Given the ad hoc nature of past UN missions in East Timor/Timor-Leste, the hybrid character of security operations conducted independent of the UN flag, and the general lack of governance capacity inside the new nation, this article explicitly argues in favor of extending PBC commitment to Timor-Leste. [3] Background Born out of a 24-year guerrilla struggle Timor has faced hard choices in meeting regional challenges. In part, this is a reference to relations with Muslim-majority Indonesia and, in part, reference to Australia, a major aid donor and contributor to its small northern neighbor in the security sector, but also a country that has played hardball in the negotiation of contested maritime boundaries and in the sharing of oil and gas revenues, crucial for the new nation's survival.
Since attaining independence on 20 May 2002 under the popularly elected Fretilin government, the fledgling state of Timor-Leste has offered two sides to the international community. Here was an example of successful United Nations stewardship and transfer of ownership as exemplified by the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) mission. In its time the Timor-Leste model had even been touted as a template to be applied to a number of other situations including Afghanistan. Besides coming under the scrutiny of the founders of the PBC, the Timor-Leste case entered a number of UN planning documents and discussions. [4] With good reason, the UN was careful to craft a successor mission, the United Nations Support Mission in East Timor (UNMISET), especially with a view to building capacity in the new nation's fledgling administration. Even so, special concerns remained over the security sector, including the induction and training of a Timor-Leste armed forces, Falintil-Forcas Defencas Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), and a TimorLeste police force, Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste, (PNTL). The fragility of the security situation was also underscored by a series of destabilizing events, including a virtual coup attempt in Dili on 4 December 2002. Not only did this affair, which saw an attack on the Prime Minister's residence, reveal the weakness of the PNTL in crowd control, but also pointed up the ambiguity in the UNMISET mandate over security alongside the independent state. In April 2005 a Catholic church-based confrontation also presented the government with a serious crisis. Continuing through 2006 various isolated security incidents in the countryside by disgruntled elements, including former anti-Indonesia resistance veterans, ex-pro-Indonesia militia and messianic-linked movements also disrupted the peace. Despite pledges by the world body to bring to book the perpetrators of crimes against humanity inside East Timor -notably a slew of Indonesian generals -such as eventually ruled by a UN-backed Special Crimes Court in Dili, weaknesses in the justice sector, as explained below, have actually helped to sow a culture of impunity where murder, arson and other heinous crimes go virtually unpunished. [5] With the administration and UN agencies as the largest employer of waged labor the economic prospects of youth drawn to Dili from all the districts remained grim just as the new nation commanded the lowest per capita GDP in the region. Left to struggle under pro-market World Bank priorities, agriculture -the traditional employer in Timor-Leste -remained highly susceptible to the vagaries of the El Nino effect and the perennial cycle of floods and droughts, leaving many peasant households on the brink of starvation. By -2004 , just as Timor-Leste began to command oil revenues generated from the Timor Sea, so the Fretilin government operated a budget surplus.
But with little experience at project management budgets characteristically remained unspent just as job generation failed to kick off. Political risk, bureaucratic obstacles, and a rising culture of patronage, corruption and crime which began to surface inside and outside of a number of departments and ministries dampens the enthusiasm of all but the most adventurous or opportunist foreign investors, just as the malaise saps the efficiency of the government. [6] While the World Bank and the international community lavished praise upon the Fretilin government for its prudence in establishing a Petroleum Fund modeled along the lines of that of Norway, whereby only interest would be deducted from an escrew account deposited in New York, leaving the balance for future generations, few in the street could comprehend this logic. More than that, as a number of analysts have highlighted, the haste on the part of the international community to foist international models of governance upon a "subsistence state" was bound to fail, given the depth of tradition, the prevalence of custom law typical of "Melanesian"-type societies such as on Timor island, the lack of a bureaucratic state tradition such as found in neighboring Southeast Asian states, and the historical failure of Portuguese, Japanese and Indonesian occupiers to bequeath an embedded civil service tradition. [7] 
Crisis of 2006 Revisited
Much hubris can be attached to the act of some 400 F-FDTL deserters who demonstrated in Dili on In late March violent incidents provoked by the Petitioner group in Dili led to the arrest of 48 including 8 members of the dismissed F-FDTL. On 28-29 April violent riots in Dili by hundreds of dismissed F-FDTL and supporters led to 5 dead and 60 injured in a clash with PNTL leading to some 100 houses burnt or damaged and with residents fleeing the city. This was one day after the Petitioner group rejected a government offer to establish a high level commission to investigate alleged regional discrimination. Meantime, with morale sapped and loyalties divided, the PNTL commenced to disintegrate with many members going over to the Petitioner group, and with others disarmed, leaving it virtually bereft of command structure. Even the police chief abandoned his post.
Just as Interior Minister Lobato threatened to arrest the rampaging protesters, so a government communiqué blamed Colimau 2000, a shadowy group of ex-guerrillas and disgruntled villagers led by Osario Leki, for hijacking the soldier's grievances. [9] Even so, the picture is undoubtedly more complex. As it would later emerge, opposition parties Partido Democratico (PD), led by Fernando "Lasama" Araujo, attracting support from Indonesian-educated youth along with 7 westerners, and the conservative but marginal União Democratica Timorenses (UDT) were also in conversation with the Petitioner group. As discussed below, PD was especially well positioned to join in the push from the streets for political change along with armed gangs such as Colimau 2000, especially via its youth wing. [ Confronted with the prospect of a "failed state," as discussed below, consensus emerged in the Security Council to mandate a fresh UN mission. Notwithstanding the political risk involved in this fragile environment, priority was given to overseeing fresh elections. Just as elections in politically vulnerable settings should not be seen as a general panacea, however beloved of the international community, UNOTIL nevertheless began to prepare the country for both presidential and 8 legislative elections. There was also recognition of the necessity to consummate the rebuilding of failed institutions in the attempt to achieve the kind of sustainable development necessary to break the cycle of unemployment and poverty that helped to fuel the violence. But as well recognized, the underlying cause of the crisis of 2006 lay with the security sector and the rebuilding of this sector was at the heart of Security Council discussions on the new mission. The crisis was not without Notwithstanding the international military and police presence, violence flared with "gangs and thugs" -to use the words of the Australian force commander -engaging in widespread acts of violence, arson and intimidation, often against adversaries, perhaps better known to themselves than outsiders. Although such violence was often parlayed in the media -and by the President himself -as a fundamental ethnic clash between east and west, it was obvious that opponents of Fretilin, ranging from the Petitioner groups to the PD party and the usual culprits including proIndonesia martial arts gangs found the perfect pretext to settle scores. Fataluku-speaking migrants to Dili from the east became an easy target triggering an exodus; havenots lined up against haves, looting and burning seemingly at will, but selectively as well.
Even so, Australia faced down international condemnation for not protecting such sensitive government buildings as the offices of the Attorney General (where computers and court records were looted), along with ministries of development, agriculture, the national police headquarters, as well as rice warehouses. More astute observers began to read into this situation one of economic desperation on the part of urban unemployed. Added to that, a generation of children outside of formal education, also proved capable of being drawn into a cycle of violent behavior.
Needless to say, the state apparatus and public services were seriously disrupted in Dili, although services held up better in most of the districts. Shooting incidents, house burnings and even the Who, then, are the "gangs and thugs" referred to by the Australian military spokesperson? The object of one NGO study, Dili's gangs, numbering some hundreds of different bairo (village)-based youth groups, comprise diverse elements. Among them are a plethora of martial arts groups (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) with membership at around 20,000, and with origins going back to the pre-independence period.
Other gangs of more recent origin appear to have emerged out of the unemployed and poverty stricken youth inside and outside of the IDP camps. Certain may be criminal elements loyal to gang bosses in some cases seeking to settle land disputes; certain may have targeted easterners, in large part owing to commercial rivalry, some may be purely opportunistic and some may be loosely in the pay of or aligned to political interests. Both Fretilin and opposition parties maintain links with gangs, just as certain are led by former resistance fighters. What is for sure is that, armed with crude and sometimes deadly weapons, alongside rocks, the gangs have been able to raise the costs of the international security presence, just as they destabilized and even paralyzed business, commerce, and government in the capital, and to a far lesser extent in certain of the districts.
Even so, according to the NGO study, not all youth have resorted to violence and most youth groups actually seek in positive ways to unify their communities through collective activities. As voluntaristic groups, they operate below the level of more formalized NGOs. [13] Regime Change As intimated, one major outcome of the violence was the downfall of Prime Minister Alkatiri although not immediately the Fretilin government. Although the Canberra government went out of its way to avoid the charge of interfering in East Timor's domestic politics, differences emerged between Portugal and Australia especially over matters of state. Answering back to Australian Prime Minister John Howard's charge of "poor governance" in East Timor, Portuguese Foreign Minister Diogo Freitas da Amaral stated, "We disagree with such declarations by foreign government." [14] There is good reason to believe as well that, overthrowing the government was also the intention of those fomenting violence, namely the Petitioner groups and the opportunistic "gangs and thugs" that rampaged through Dili. Not all violence was random but certain carefully coordinated. We observe that, in one of the worst acts of violence, the 6-member family of the former Interior Minister Lobato were killed.
On 27 May violence by rampaging youths led the Prime Minister to publicly allege he was facing down a coup. Australian academic Tim Anderson also finds Australian backing for Alkatiri's removal as crucial "not just for the personalities involved, but also for the country's economic development," [15] in part a reference to the tense negotiations between Canberra and the Alkatiri Minister. Ending much speculation, Ramos-Horta (non Fretilin) was confirmed as Prime Minister, an appointment widely hailed in Canberra.
As the security situation stabilized, the Joint Task force sought different armed groups to surrender their weapons voluntarily. Major Reinado was the first faction leader to partially comply. Selfstyled "death squad" leader Rai-Los also handed over some weapons in a ceremony in Liquisa on  Prime Minister Alkatiri was cited as failing to use his authority to denounce the weapons transfer, although no evidence was found leading to the recommendation that he be prosecuted, at least not before further investigation.
 President Xanana Gusmão was blamed for adding fuel to the fire by publicly claiming that the dismissal of the petitioners was unjust while lending credibility to their claims of regional discrimination.
 Generally, the Commission found "the fragility of various State institutions and the weakness of the rule of law were the underlying factors that contributed to the crisis." [23] That is undoubtedly the crux of the matter, but the Commission is notably silent on the failings of international actors and the UN body itself. Although Alkatiri was personally cleared by the Commission of complicity in acts of illicit arms distribution, such as committed by Lobato, his opponents, both internal and external -and there were many -seized upon this innuendo to bring down the government. While Gusmão was directly censored by the UN Commission for inflaming community divisions at the height of the crisis, Ramos-Horta may not be totally immune from the same charge. Certainly, the Canberra government was not displeased by regime change in Timor- Timorese soldiers killing at least nine. As determined, he was supplied with weapons by Lobato. As echoed in a high profile Australian television documentary, Rai-Los alleged that Alkatiri was personally involved in setting up a hit squad to eliminate political rivals. Even so, Fretilin has counter-claimed that Rai-Los carried a travel authorization letter carried by Gusmão. [24] In any case, on 10 July 2006 Jose Ramos-Horta was sworn in as interim Prime Minister of the Second Constitutional government two weeks after Alkatiri resigned amid accusations that he was responsible for the violence. On his part Alkatiri remained indignant claiming to be a victim of a number of conspiracies on the part of unnamed international actors, including sections of the Australian media.
As East Timor-watcher Joseph Nevins commented upon these findings, still in need of investigation was the role of the Catholic Church "which helped fan the flames that sparked anti-government (and by extension anti-eastern violence." Added to that, as elaborated below, Gusmão's "murky" role in communicating with the rebel Reinado outside of official channels also must be investigated. [25] 
Fretilin Government Failings and Fallout
For want of capacity, as suggested, it was apparent that the nascent Fretilin administration proved incapable at project management, procurement and implementation, leaving spending gaps across the macro-economy. Where government spending and foreign investment could have helped to kick start the rural and urban economy, rising urban youth unemployment and frustration at the lack of development fueled popular anger. While such ineptness could be attributed to lack of experience and managerial capability on the part of the Alkatiri cabinet, the development and democracy discourse parlayed by international community, however well-intended, also obviously underestimated the specific historical, cultural and political setting of the fledgling nation. Gutteres and supporters also worked in favor of Gusmão. Not all were happy with this outcome. Notably, Fretilin supporters launched a rash of house burnings but, overall, major violence was undoubtedly averted through the heavy international security and monitoring presence as much through pacts of non-violence entered into between the adversaries holding out some hope for future electoral contests.
Even so, the electoral process appeared as a prelude to a constitutional crisis. Rather than confirming legitimacy and socializing democratic norms, the outcome saw the former President and Prime Minister exchanging roles, in a situation where the party which gained the plurality of votes (Fretilin) being relegated to the opposition. Much turned upon interpretations of section 106 of the RDTL constitution (Portuguese version binding) whereby it is allowed that the Prime Minister shall be designated by the political party or alliance with parliamentary majority (before or after the election is not clarified) and appointed by the President after consultation with the political parties sitting in the national parliament. . The World Bank, the ADB and the major donors soon began to position themselves to influence the incoming PMA government especially as it sought to create -rhetorically at least -a more favorable environment for business and foreign investment. Land commodification might be one outcome, at least if the intractable problem of contested land title can be solved. The Fretilin preference for onshore LNG processing might also be sacrificed at Australian bidding. Gusmão already made known his preference to dip into the Petroleum Fund during the election campaign. The funds are not wanting, just as the Petroleum Fund is accruing several million dollars a month (far more than previous projections), but neither is deliverance guaranteed under the PMA government even if, as Alkatiri suggests, the new administration will basically follow the Fretilin administration's leads. human rights, nor should it do anything that might foster them." [31] By joining elite consensus on reconciliation, even Fretilin was seen by many in Timor, from victims to activist NGOs, as out of touch, more the surprise that Alkatiri would actually defend the work of the CTF in Jakarta. Definitely the Indonesian people as much their leadership need to know the truth of events in East Timor but they could do worse than read the Indonesian language version of the CAVR report and act upon it.
Presidential Assassination Bid of February 2008
In yet another twist to the Reinado story, in the early morning of 11 February 2008 the rebel leader along with one of his band was shot dead by a F-FDTL guard in the compound of the Dili house of Ramos-Horta. Imprudently returning to the house from an early morning jog, the President was seriously wounded by enraged members of Reinado's group who, apparently undetected by UN or Australian peacekeepers, had descended from the mountains to Dili during the night. Another party of rebels led by Gastão Salsinha mounted a near simultaneous ambushed on the Prime Minister's car.
Slow to receive medical attention, the near assassination of the President again raised questions as to the co-ordination of UN police and F-FDTL. In any case, shot twice, Ramos-Horta only survived massive loss of blood thanks to expert medical care in Dili and surgery in an Australian hospital where he remained for almost three months before returning to Dili.
Internationally the attempt on the life of the RDTL president attracted widespread condemnation.
Not only did the event further highlight the fragility of the security situation -a "state of siege" and curfew was brought down over most of Timor (only lifted on 22 April with the exception of one district) but, as mentioned, the Canberra government dispatched additional military and police.
Many questions remained to be answered about this event, whether or not it was a coup de etat attempt, or assassination bid, or an act of revenge. Once recovered, Ramos-Horta lost no time in accusing "contacts" in both Australia (Reinado's lawyer-lover) and Indonesia (non-official militialinks) behind his near assassination, vociferously denied by Indonesian government spokespersons.
He also slammed UN forces for their slow response in coming to his rescue. Questions also remained as to the provenance of A$800,000 deposited into the Australian bank account of Reinado's lover; the mysterious interview given by Reinado to a Jakarta television station, and the connection with Hercules Rozario Marcal, a Timor-born-Jakarta-based militia-gangland boss with close ties to Indonesian intelligence and received by Gusmão three weeks prior to the assassination attempt. We wonder as well as to the true import of a DVD recording made by Reinado -widely circulated in Dili -brazenly accusing Gusmão of having encouraged the original rebellion.
According to veteran analyst John McBeth, in a comment upon the alleged Indonesia connection, the whole episode raises questions about the "shadowy figures" within the Jakarta military/intelligence establishment who still "haunt" Indonesian politics. [32] Whatever, it is clear that the President (and Prime Minister) were too trusting in dealing with the rebel-hero. Once again in mid-January, in the company of the Development Minister João Gonçalves, Ramos-Horta met up with Reinado in the mountain town of Maubisse and informed him that he intended to announce an amnesty on 20 May that would cover all crimes committed during the crisis of 2006. As mentioned, on 7 February Ramos-Horta hosted a meeting at his home to discuss the prospect of an early election.. All senior members of the Coalition along with the Fretilin opposition were present. The question of an amnesty for Reinado was also on the agenda. No formal consensus was arrived at during this meeting and further meetings were planned for 12 and 14
February. Obviously, with the denouement of 11 February, this timetable was derailed. In fact, on 10 February, secret negotiations between Ramos-Horta and Reinaldo continued via emissaries linked with a so-called Movement for Unity and Justice (MUNJ) group. It is now crystal clear that this shadow diplomacy with the highly unstable rebel leader came unstuck, just as the rebel-heroknown for his unstable and erratic behavior -ordered his men to prepare for a visit to Ramos-Horta's house. The motive is subject to both rumor and investigation.
To be sure, as Australian academic Bob Boughton has written, Reinado was never a lone actor.
Reinado, in this argument, took part in a coordinated movement to overthrow the elected Fretilin government. In so doing he won or gathered support from the second largest political party of the time, PD (led by Fernando Lasama Araujo), former supporters of integration with Indonesiacertain including militia elements -disaffected veterans, and elements of the Catholic Church. In this Reinado gained appeal as a symbol of opposition to the so-perceived illegitimate Marxist Fretilin government. Reinado also proved to be serviceable to the electoral goals of PD especially as both drew support from the same population base west of Dili. We note that both Gusmão and Horta sought to block the arrest of Reinado, despite calls by UN investigators to bring them to book for a 32 slate of crimes, just as PD support was crucial in sapping away at Fretilin electoral support. As Broughton asserts, "Under the 'guise' of engaging in dialogue with these dangerous anti-democratic forces, Gusmão and Ramos-Horta refused to move against them, in order to cement the votes they needed -first for Ramos-Horta to win the presidency, and then for Gusmão's party to form an alliance including PD to take government." [33] The hunt by a joint military-police command -controversial in itself -for Gastão Salsinha and his Gusmão's connivance, to avert a scenario whereby Fretilin would be brought back into government? [34] Returning to Dili in April 2008, Ramos-Horta pledged to pardon 80 criminals involved in the violence of 2006, including Lobato. Such an act of reconciliation may have its merits but hardly brings justice or closure for these dastardly acts and outcomes. As the Australian government warns its citizens, "We advise you to reconsider your travel to East Timor at this time because of the fragile security situation and the risk of violent civil unrest. The situation could deteriorate without warning.
There is a possibility that Australians and Australian interests may be especially targeted." [35] Prudent advice but one wonders whether the country that was basically in charge of security and intelligence actually brought this situation down upon its head. Undoubtedly, accountability for the events of 2006 will be necessary to create an atmosphere of trust and reconciliation for the future but, the need for full accountability for serious human rights violations and past crimes against humanity under the long Indonesian occupation is likely to prove 34 just as important. As highlighted in the International Crisis Group Report, only a holistic approach to peacebuilding in East Timor can break the cycle of impunity necessary to safeguard the human security environment including the population displacement crisis.
Conclusions
Set back years by the violence of 2006, this author feels that only a deeply embedded and unencumbered UNMIT, or better still a longer term commitment as implied by the PBC, can lead East Timor out of its lingering crisis. This is especially the case as the new nation has the wherewithal for economic recovery -oil reserves amounting to over one billion dollars in escrow account -to see through sustainable development.
Notes
A highly abbreviated version of this article first appeared on
